Cases Archive

Final hearing of a father’s application for contact – Pauffley J orders no direct contact.

The mother appealed against registration and enforcement of a French order granting sole residence to the father. Consideration of the effect of Article 23(c) of Brussels II Revised when French service rules complied with and Annex II certificate granted but actual service had not been effected. Appeal allowed.

Final hearing of private law proceedings, which had the involvement of two local authorities and the children being represented by their Guardian. The Court made a Shared Residence Order and Supervision Order, finding the threshold criteria to be crossed. Finally, the Court made an Order by consent pursuant to s.91(14) Children Act 1989, preventing either parent from making a further application in respect of the child for two years without the Court’s permission.

Whether an Order dealing with temporary removal from the jurisdiction was a final order concerning matters of parental responsibility within the meaning and understanding of Brussels II Revised.

Disclosure — Serious sexual abuse allegations against the father — Contact with child suspended — Accuser suffered poor mental and physical health — Whether the balance fell in favour of disclosure

Appeal arising from Hague Convention proceedings in which the High Court Judge at first instance made an order for DNA paternity testing of the child. The Court of Appeal held such direction to be premature, and instead that the Court should have awaited the outcome of expert evidence in relation to Latvian law to establish whether the respondent father had a “right of custody” without the need for the father to be a biological parent

Consideration in private law proceedings as to whether, imminently, steps should be taken which could lead to the giving, in some form or another, of oral evidence by that vulnerable individual

The mother appealed against the decision of a circuit judge, following a fact-finding hearing, to relax the restrictions around the father’s contact to the child, such as to allow the father contact at his home. The mother asserted that the court at first instance had exercised its discretion wrongfully and prematurely. Delivering the lead judgment of the Court of Appeal, Black LJ held that the appeal could only succeed if it could be shown that there had been a wrong exercise of discretion. The mother had failed to demonstrate that the judge had erred or that the decision of the court at first instance was beyond the ambit of its discretion. Appeal unanimously dismissed.